Intergenerational justice, intra-generational counterfactuals, and the non-identity problem by Das, Ramon
www.ssoar.info
Intergenerational justice, intra-generational
counterfactuals, and the non-identity problem
Das, Ramon
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Das, R. (2019). Intergenerational justice, intra-generational counterfactuals, and the non-identity problem.
Intergenerational Justice Review, 5(2), 1-48. https://doi.org/10.24357/igjr.5.2.767
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66434-7
Intergenerational Justice Review
2/2019
48
 natural way of understanding the difficulty posed by 
the non-identity problem (NIP) for questions of inter-
generational justice is that it blocks the transmission 
of plausible moral claims about collectives to their individual 
members. It is plausible, for instance, that some rich states of 
North America and Europe are morally responsible for historic 
injustices associated with colonialism and slavery; and for historic 
emissions that have produced harmful climate change. Likewise, 
it is plausible that indigenous peoples and African Americans have 
been harmed by the legacy of colonialism and/or slavery; and that 
many poor, undeveloped states have failed to benefit (via indus-
trialisation) from historic carbon emissions. Yet the NIP seems to 
block the transmission of such claims about groups to present-day 
individuals. 
In all such cases, the fundamental non-identity problem derives 
from a natural counterfactual reading of what it means to say that 
present-day individuals are morally affected by long-ago actions 
or events. Such counterfactuals are overtly intergenerational, 
purporting to consider what the moral implications for an indi-
vidual would be, had some event(s) prior to her conception not 
occurred. For instance, if we understand “Anika has been harmed 
by the legacy of colonialism” as the counterfactual claim that 
 Anika would have been better off had British colonialism never 
occurred, then we face the familiar problem that Anika would not 
have existed had British colonialism never occurred. Again, it is 
the overtly intergenerational reading of the relevant harm claim 
that invites the NIP. And this raises the question: is there another 
way of understanding such claims that preserves their meaning 
but avoids the NIP?
I argued that there is.1 Focusing on the case of climate change, I 
show that there is a way of understanding the claim that citizens 
of rich developed states have benefited from industrialisation that 
appeals to intra-generational counterfactuals rather than the usual 
intergenerational ones. For instance, we can understand “Esther 
has benefited from industrialisation” as the counterfactual claim 
that Esther is better off than she would have been, had she been 
raised from birth in a poor, undeveloped country. This reading of 
the relevant benefit claim evades the NIP altogether, since it rests 
on intra-generational counterfactuals that do not refer to events 
that occurred before Esther was conceived.
I’ll now suggest that this intra-generational approach to intergen-
erational justice can be extended to certain cases of historic injus-
tice, when three conditions are met. First, it should be relatively 
easy to imagine (counterfactually) that a person could have been 
raised in a group very different in morally relevant respects from 
the group in which she is (actually) raised. Second, being raised in 
that alternative group should make a morally relevant difference 
to the person’s life. Third, it should be plausible that the rele-
vant groups have been harmed by or benefited from some historic 
action or event. When these three conditions are met, morally 
relevant historic harms or benefits are plausibly transmitted from 
collectives to their present-day individual members and the NIP 
does not arise. 
For example, suppose that Haiti – the poorest country in the 
western world – has been harmed by the legacy of French colonia-
lism. (This satisfies our third condition.) If so, it seems intuitively 
plausible that a present-day Haitian, Phillipe, has been harmed 
by that legacy as well. We can understand this claim as follows: 
statistically, it is highly probable that Phillipe is materially worse 
off than he would have been, had he been adopted at birth and 
raised by a French family in France.
In this case, it is deeply plausible that our first two conditions are 
met, since it is easy to imagine – indeed is doubtless true – that 
some very poor Haitian children have been adopted by French 
families, and plausible that they have benefited (at least mate-
rially) from being raised in France. In general, the first two con-
ditions will be met in cases in which historic injustice involves 
two geographically distinct groups (e.g. France and Haiti) and 
is closely linked to vastly different life prospects for present-day 
inhabitants of the two groups.
Compare this to the case of slavery in the United States. In this 
case, the two groups (American whites and blacks) are not geo-
graphically distinct in anything like the way that France and Haiti 
are distinct. More important, due to the inherently racial aspect 
of the relevant historic injustice, it is unlikely that the second con-
dition is met: it is far from obvious that an African American 
child would be better off being raised by a white family in a pre-
dominantly white neighbourhood. So it seems fair to say that the 
intra-generational approach doesn’t work equally well in all cases 
of historic injustice. Nonetheless, it clearly works and avoids the 
NIP in some important cases.
Ramon Das is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Wellington, New 
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